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Roseanne Sessa 
Introduction 
Government officials, including members of Congress, communicate with members of 
the media regarding sensitive material on a daily basis. 1 Subsequently, this information often 
reaches the public through various media channels.2 This information helps the public sort out 
critical issues, which is a core feature of our democracy 3 
A recent example demonstrates just how important this system is: in April 2012, 
intelligence officials briefed journalists about their assessment of al-Qaeda and the future threats 
the terrorist regime posed to the United States a year after the killing of Osama bin Laden.4 
Armed with this knowledge, the public was able to stay informed in the event they needed to 
make a decision about related governmental policies. However, due to a recent rise in 
unauthorized leaks, the Senate Intelligence Committee proposed and approved an amendment to 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20135 with provisions that, if adopted, would 
severely infringe upon the media's relationship with the government, and in turn, the people. If 
provisions of this magnitude are enacted, information such as the recent assessment of al-Qaeda 
would never reach the public realm, leading to a wealth of unintended consequences. 
This note will argue that legislation such as Title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 will negatively impact the system of congressional oversight by prohibiting 
members of Congress from talking to media outlets about intelligence activities. Congress uses 
the media as a way to exercise its constitutionally implied duty of oversight of the Executive 
1 Editorial Board, Editorial, A Bill to Stop Security Leaks Puts a Plug on Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 30, 
20 12, http://www. washington post.com/opin ions/sque I chi ng-publ ic- interest- in-national-
security/20 12/07/30/gJQAFOpHLX _story.htm I. 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
''!d. 
5 Press Release, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss Announce Committee 
Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (Jul. 25, 20 12), available at 
http://www. inte lligence.senate .gov/press/record.cfm?id~3 3 73 3 3. 
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Branch. Legislation like Title V would therefore limit Congress's ability to monitor the conduct 
of intelligence agencies and would ultimately pose a great risk to the checks and balances of 
government and the national security of the United States. 
Part I will discuss intelligence leaks and congressional oversight with respect to the 
media. Part II will provide an overview of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013 and its relevant provisions. Part III will discuss the recent backlash that has occurred from 
various groups and media outlets conceming the Act. Part IV will outline the legal and policy 
implications of an Act like this for Congress, the media, and the public. Finally, Part V will 
discuss why Congress should not adopt such a bill as well as potential solutions that should be 
pursued in lieu of the provisions attached to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013. 
Part I: Intelligence Leaks and Congressional Oversight With Respect to the Media 
A. Unauthorized and Authorized Disclosures 
Most discussions about intelligence leaks revolve around the government regulating the 
flow of national security information6 This is because the government has a substantial interest 
in protecting the national security of the country7 As such, the "executive and legislative 
branches of government have elaborate machinery for protecting the confidentiality of 
information used in policymaking and administration. "8 
A leak by a government employee is considered "the release, of outside official public 
information channels, of previously undisclosed information."9 Leaks can either be classified as 
6 Alan Katz, Government lnjimnation Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. I I 08, I 09 ( 1976), 
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicsofsecrecy/papers/reading/Katz.pdf. 
7 !d. 
8 /d. at 108 
9 !d. 
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authorized or unauthorized. 10 An authorized leak is defined as "an established part of 
government policy" 11 while an unauthorized leak is said to "[occur] when a government 
employee makes public information that her superiors and the government information 
machinery have chosen not to disclose."12 Whether a leak is authorized or unauthorized, those 
that are disseminated to the public by the media are an important source of political news and are 
likewise an effective means of influencing government policy. 13 This note will focus in 
particular on the consequences of unauthorized leaks. 
In 2009, Former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, wrote a memorandum to 
the directors of the sixteen United States Intelligence Community Agencies. 14 In this 
memorandum, Blair discussed the severe consequences posed by the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information. 15 He noted that "disclosures of classified information, including 'leaks' 
to the media can compromise sensitive sources and methods ... and may allow our adversaries to 
learn about, deny, counteract, and deceive our intelligence collection methods, leading to the loss 
of critical capabilities, resources, and even lives." 16 Blair further noted that over recent years, 
unauthorized disclosures have impaired the ability of the Intelligence Community to accomplish 
its mission and support its national security objectives. 17 While these unauthorized disclosures 
have the potential to jeopardize national security, Congress also utilizes the media as a way to 
exercise oversight of the Executive Branch, which will be discussed in the following section. 
B. Congressional Oversight o[the Executive Branch 
10 Alan Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. I 108, 108 (1976). 
II fd. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 GARY ROSS, WHO W ATCIIES THE WATCHMEN? THE CONFl.ICT BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 5 (Nl Pressed., 20 II), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/ross.pdf. 
15 !d. at 5-6. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
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Among Congress's duties are creating legislation, appropriating funds for Executive 
Branch operations, and monitoring whether the Executive Branch carries out its responsibilities 
ettectively and in accordance with the law. 18 This type of monitoring of the Executive Branch is 
also referred to as congressional oversight. 19 The Congressional Research Service defines 
congressional oversight as "the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of 
public policy- of the Executive Branch,"20 and this duty of oversight is embodied in Congress's 
implied powers under the Constitution.Z 1 Congress oversees the Executive Branch through a 
wide variety of channels, organizations, and structures.22 Oversight techniques range from 
investigation and rep01iing requirements to more contemporary means23 - such as utilizing 
media outlets24 Thus, "members of Congress, as the elected representatives of the American 
people, [have) the obligation to be the eyes and ears of the citizenry by closely watching over the 
policies of the President and executive officials. "25 This fmiher holds true tor policies dealing 
with intelligence and national security where the President is the "sole organ for the Nation in 
foreign affairs ... carrying with it preeminent authority in [these two policy areas]."26 
18 Kathleen Clark, Congress's Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, II U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (20 II). 
19 FREDERICK M. KAISER, WALTER J. OLESZEK & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH Sl·:RV., RL 30240, 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL I (20II), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf. 
20 !d. 
21 !d. 
22 /d. 
23 !d. 
24 See discussion infi·a p. 5. See also Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate (Aug. 15, 20 12), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/t1les/assets/8-15-12 _ -_ aclu _on_ s _ 3454 _title_ v _-_final. pdf. 
25 Vicki Divolll President Obama's First Two Years: A Legal Reflection: The "Full Access Doctrine": Congress's 
Constitutional Entitlement to National Security !nformationji·om the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 
500. 
26 Office of Legal Counsell U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President, 2006, 2, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthmities.pdf. See also Frederick A. 0. Schwartz, Jr. eta!. 
UNCIIECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007), I. 
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Because the Executive Branch is traditionally responsible for handling matters of 
intelligence and national security/7 it often uses its authority to limit the distribution of such 
information to the other branches of government.28 Some information, however, must be 
delivered to the Legislative Branch not only to help protect national security, but so that 
Congress can monitor the Executive Branch as a part of the government's system of separation 
of powers.29 Since the Executive Branch is able to select what intelligence and national security 
information makes its way to the Legislative Branch, Congress often utilizes other means, such 
as the media, to exercise its oversight function. 30 
Congress empowers the media with information it receives to help it moderate Executive 
Branch policies and activities that require close scrutiny.31 With this information, the media 
attempts to influence executive behavior.32 This relationship, however, is not one sided. The 
media also equips Congress with information it may need in order to perform its own job, 
creating a symbiotic relationship whereby33 Congress has a chief ally in the mass media. 34 If 
Congress is deprived of access to this to information from the Executive Branch, the public is in 
turn disposed of their absolute entitlement under the Constitution to ensure that the Executive 
Branch is not abusing its powers or using those powers poorly,35 and the system of checks and 
27 Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to the President-Elect, THE WHITE HOUSE 
TRANSITION PROJECT (2007), http:l/loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/presidential-power-national-security.pdf. 
28 Kathleen Clark, Congress's Rightto Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, II U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 930-931 (20 II). 
29 !d. 
30 0 d' . 
,.)ee Iscuss1on supra p. 4. 
31 Kathleen Clark, Congress's Rightto Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, II U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
32 /d. 
33 Murrey Marder, The Press and the Presidency: Silencing the Watchdog, NIEMAN WATCHDOG (Apr. 16, 2008), 
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction~background.view&backgroundid~240. See also Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Article, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security iriformation, 83 Ind. 
L.J. 233, 256 (2008). 
34 Kathleen Clark, Congress's Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, II U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
35 Vicki Divoll, President Obama's First Two Years: A Legal Reflection: The "Full Access Doctrine": Congress's 
Constitutional Entitlement to National Security Infiormationfrom the Executive 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493. 
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balances is then disrupted.36 What has further set this balance out of kilter has been the increase 
. . ~ . ., . l s ' ll 1h . k 1n executive povvcr anu pnvttege srnce t 1e eptemoer atrac s. 
C. Increase in Executive Power and Privilege Since September JJ'h 
There has been a steadily increasing trend in executive power and the September 11th 
terrorist attacks have only accelerated this growth.37 For over a decade, the Executive Branch 
has operated on a "need to know" basis where certain information is safely protected and 
sparingly distributed.3x Congress has gradually found it more difficult to obtain information 
about how the Executive Branch exercises their power in various policymaking areas, 
specifically that of national security.39 
Executive privilege represents the President's ability to withhold certain information sought 
out by Congress.40 Operating in a perfect system, this privilege would allow the President to seek 
candid advice from his advisors while still permitting Congress to obtain just enough information 
for it to perform its oversight function. 41 However, no system is perfect; in fact, executive 
privilege has recently harmed Congress's oversight function by promoting secrecy.42 The 
President typically acts with little deference to or collaboration with Congress on matters 
relevant to national security43 History shows that executive power is not necessarily benign,44 
36 !d. 
37 EMILY BERMAN, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A LEGISlATIVE REMEDY I (2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Executive.Privilege.pdf 
38 !d. 
39 !d. 
40 !d. at 2. 
•II /d. 
42/d. 
'
13 Frederick A. 0. Schwartz, Jr. eta!. UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF 
TERROR (2007), I. 
'
14 EMILY BERMAN, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY I (2009), available at 
http://www.brennaneenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Executive.Privilege.pdf. ("When presidents are 
allowed to implement policies that have not been subject to scrutiny, the results have included justifying abusive 
interrogation and detention policies through flawed legal analysis; manipulating prosecutorial decision-making for 
partisan ends; engaging in unlawful conspiracies to influence the outcome of elections; unlawfully funding foreign 
paramilitary groups; and conducting unlawful surveillance of Americans."). 
6 
Roseanne Sessa 
and that this newly acquired executive privilege has actually aided in tipping the constitutional 
balance of power. 45 
The Framers of the Constitution created a system of checks and balances to act as "a self~ 
executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of 
the other."46 This system of checks and balances relies on transparencl7 and "when secrecy 
thwarts the efforts of the people and their elected representatives to obtain information, it 
undermines Congress's core functions, its ability to enact legislation and exercise oversight. "48 
The main problem, therefore, with the rise of executive power and privilege, is that it serves 
to limit Congress's oversight of the Executive Branch. To begin with, Congress has limited tools 
available to it to perform its oversight function. 49 Even when Congress does succeed in 
obtaining the information it seeks, it is often the case that too much time has passed in order for 
it to actually serve a useful purpose.50 To take away one of Congress's primary means of 
oversight- the media- would extremely exacerbate this function even more. 
More importantly, Congress's need for information on national security issues is greater than 
its need for information in other policymaking areas. 51 Because this information is well guarded, 
the public depends on Congress to scrutinize national security policies to ensure that the 
government is not infringing on any of their rights. 52 The history of leaks, as discussed in the 
following section, shows just how vulnerable this area of policymaking is.53 
D. Historical National Security Leaks in the Media 
45 !d. 
46 THE FEDERAI.IST No. 47 (James Madison). 
47 EMILY BERMAN, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY I (2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Executive.Privilege.pdf. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. at 3. 
50 !d. at 9. 
51 !d. at 15. 
52 !d. 
53 s d' . . ,r, 8 
. ee ISCUSSIOO tn1 ra p. , 
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Since the founding of the United States, leaks have played an important role in the 
country's governance.54 Nearly every administration is linked to leaking some type of national 
security information, 55 beginning with the first President of the United States, George 
Washington. 56 One of the first significant leaks that occurred during Washington's 
administration was when John Jay returned from Great Britain in 1795 with a treaty aimed at 
ending ongoing hostilities from the American Revolution. 57 Washington, however, did not want 
the contents of the treaty disclosed to the public until it was first reviewed by the Federalist 
Senate. 58 Despite Washington's wishes, an Anti-Federalist newspaper got hold of the entire text 
of the treaty and decided to publish it 5 9 
Other leaks of classified information throughout following administrations have included the 
details of the Iran-Contra Affair;60 the government's radiation and biological weapon 
experiments on unwitting Americans;61 the effectiveness of weapons systems;62 human rights 
abuses in Latin America, Asia, and Afi·ica;63 and many other illegally or morally reprehensive 
54 Micha Zenko, A Brief History of National Security Links, POLITICS, POWER, AND PREVENTATIVE ACTION, 
(Jun. 8, 20 12), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/20 12/06/08/a-brief-history-of-national-security-leaks/. 
55 !d. 
56 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Article, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 Ind. I...J. 233, 249 (2008). 
57 !d. 
58 !d. 
59 ld 
60 John R. McGeehan, TilE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, http:!/www.netplaces.com/american-history/new-
conservatism/the-iran-contra-affair.htm (Word leaked to newspapers in November 1986 that the United States had 
secretly sold weapons to Iran.). 
61 U.S. Promises to Release Data on Plutonium Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 199311 I /21 /us/us-promises-to-release-data-on-plutonium-test.html (In the 1940s, 18 
patients were injected with plutonium during secret experiments.). 
62 Eric Schmitt, Israel Plays Down Effectiveness of Patriot Missile, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1991/ I 0/3 Ilworld/israel-plays-down-effectiveness-of-patriot-missile.html (Senior Israel 
scientists and military officers disclosed new information that the American Patriot missiles used in Israel during the 
Persion Gulf war destroyed fewer Scud missile warheads that previously thought.). 
63 See Raymond Bonner, News Organizations Ask White House to Veto Secrecy Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. I, 
2000), http://www .nytimes.com/2000/ I I /0 I /us/news-organizations-ask-white-house-to-veto-secrecy-measure. htm I. 
8 
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government practices. 64 Moreover, some leaks have dealt with the exposure of questionable and 
potentially illegal practices, including the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib65 and 
Guantanamo Bay;66 wiretapping outside of the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA); and extraordinary rendition.67 The nature and content of leaks has 
varied greatly since the founding of the United States, which will further be demonstrated in the 
following section's discussion of the country's most recent national security leaks. 
E. Recent National Security Leak~ in the Media 
Some media rep01ts claim that the leaks of the Obama administration are "greater in 
magnitude and sensitivity than those of previous administrations."68 President Obama, 
addressing the alleged leaks that occurred during his administration, stated in his remarks at a 
press conference in June 2012: 
We're dealing with issues that can touch on the safety and security of the 
American people, our families, or our military personnel, or our allies. And so we 
don't play with that. And it is a source of consistent frustration, not just for my 
administration but for previous administrations, when this stuffhappens.69 
Of the recent leaks in the United States, the more pettinent ones have been Stuxnet/0 a 
classified cyber-attack program aimed at Iran's nuclear facilities; 71 the Obama administration's 
64 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Article, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 254-255 (2008). 
65 James Risen, G.l.'s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/politics/29ABUS.html (Near Baghdad, American soldiers were accused of 
forcing Iraqi prisoners into acts of sexual humiliation and other abuses in order to make them talk.). 
66 See Dana Priest and Joe Stephens, Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations, WASHINGTON POST (May 9, 
2004 ), http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2004/05/09/ AR200 5040206867 .htm I. 
67 Erwin Chemerinsky, Leaks Show Secrecy Overused, NEWS OBSERVER (Jul. 30, 2010), 
http://www. newsobserver.com/20 I 0/07/30/603 53 6/leak -shows-secrecy-overused.html. 
68 Elise Cooper, Political Leaks, AMERICAN THINKER BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/20 I 2/ I 0/political_Ieaks.html. 
69 President Obama, Remarks (Jun. 8, 20 I 2), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/20 I 2/06/08/remarks-president. 
70 !d. See also Kim Zetter, Sen. Feinstein Calls for Hearing on Stuxnet Leaks as FBI Begins Probe, WIRED (Jun. 6, 
20 I 2), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/20 I 2/06/stuxnet-Ieak-investigation/ (Stuxnext was a cyber-attack created 
as a joint project of the United States and Israel that escaped its prescribed target after the Israelis made unspecified 
alterations to it. The spread of the worm led to its discovery by a computer security tirm in Belarus in June 20 I 0. 
Though denied by the Obama administration, it is alleged that they are behind the leak.). 
9 
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classified "kill list;"72 a double-agent in Yemen;73 and information relating to the bin Laden 
raid.74 These latest leaks have sparked government official's allenlion with a focus on reform.75 
Specifically, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calitornia), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, declared, "the culture of leaks has to change."76 
Part II: The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 
A. History and Purpose o(the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 
A Congressional oversight committee enacted the first Intelligence Authorization Act in 
1978 to give Congress the "ultimate oversight hammer - control over the Intelligence 
Community's purse strings."77 By contrast, Senator Feinstein in the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence proposed the Senate's version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013 after being fueled by frustrations over recent media repotis that disclosed key details of the 
. ' . . 78 
natton s counterterronsm operattons. Members of the Committee opined that each 
unauthorized disclosure puts American lives at risk, makes it more difficult to recruit assets, 
strains the trust of partners, and threatens imminent and irreparable damage to national security, 
71 Evan Perez & Adam Entous, FBI Probes Leaks on Iran Cyberattack, WALL ST. J., Jun. 5, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/articlc/SB I 00014240527023035064045774485635 I 7340 I 88.html (Information about a cyber-
attack was aimed at Iran's nuclear facilities was disclosed). 
72 Jeremy Herb, Senate Democrats Blast lVational Security Leak About Cyberattack Against Iran, HILL BLOG (Jun. 
5, 20 I 2 ), http :1/thch iII .com/b logs/ de fcon-h i I 1/po I icy-and-strategy /23098 5-senate-dems-b last -leaks-about-iranian-
cyberattacks. 
73 !d. 
74 Elise Cooper, Political Leaks, AMERICAN THINKER BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/20 I 2/ I 0/political __ leaks.html. 
75 Press Release, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss Announce Committee 
Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (Jul. 25, 20 12), available at 
http://www. intelligence. senate .gov /press/record.cfm? id~3 3 73 3 3. 
7G !d. 
77 James S. VanWagenen, A Review of Congressional Oversight, CENTRAl. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 14, 
2007, 04:51 PM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intclligcnce/csi-publications/csi-
stud ies/studies/97 unc !ass/wagenen. htrn l. 
78 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss, 
Rogers, Ruppersbcrger Deplore Leaks of Classified National Security Information (Jun. 6, 20 12), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/press-rclease/feinstein-chambliss-rogers-ruppersberger-deplore-lcaks-classified-
national-sccurity. 
10 
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especially at a time where there are constant, rapidly emerging threats. 79 George Little, Pentagon 
Press Secretary, confirmed the purpose of the bill at a July 24, 2012 Department of Defense 
News Briefing, asserting that the provisions the Senate added to the bill were not an attempt to 
go after the media, but rather to protect classified information.80 Because government officials 
have an obligation to protect classified information and national security, supporters argued the 
bill aimed to do just that.81 
Proponents of the bill claimed that it was essential to safeguard the nation and to protect 
its citizens. 82 "Leaks of classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods can 
disrupt intelligence operations, threaten the lives of intelligence officers and assets, and make 
foreign partners less likely to work with [the United States]."83 The two provisions at issue in 
this note, §§ 505 and 506, were said to give the intelligence community the resources it needs in 
order to do its job of protecting the public and the country84 In light of the recent surge of 
national security leaks that have occurred during the Obama administration, these changes are 
ones that are demanded by those who support some type of leak reform. 85 
The controversial provisions at the core of this note lie under the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence's version of the bill, encompassing Title V: Preventing Unauthorized Disclosures of 
Classified Information. The bill was introduced by Senator Feinstein and passed the Senate 
79 !d. 
80 Transcript of DOD News Briefing with George Little from the Pentagon, Jul. 24,2012, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid~5085. 
81 !d. 
82 Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Announces Committee Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 
Intelligence Authorization (Jul 25, 20 12), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
re leases? JD~ct330ad36-865a-47b2-81 e6-7e60e5e0c5d. 
83 !d. 
84 /d. 
85 See discussion supra p. 7. 
II 
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Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 2012 by a vote of 14-1 with bipartisan support. 86 
The sole dissenter, Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), stated in his minority view that the issue of 
unauthorized disclosures, according to studies, is sometimes considered a problem that cannot be 
resolved by legislation87 Senator Wyden contended, however, that the problem could be cured 
by legislation, so long as Congress does not do more harm than good.88 
B. Intelligence Authorization Act fOr Fiscal Year 2013 
Title V: Preventing Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information contained twelve 
provisions,89 several of which aimed to disrupt the flow of classified information to the press and 
public.90 The pertinent provisions, for purposes of this note, were§§ 505 and 506, which will be 
discussed further below. § 505 dealt with the prohibition on certain individuals serving as 
consultants and § 506 dealt with limitations on persons authorized to communicate with the 
media. 
C. 1\' 505: Prohibition on Certain Individuals Serving as Consultants 
Section 505 "prohibit[ ed] certain persons possessing an active security clearance from 
entering into contracts or binding agreements with the media in order to provide analysis or 
commentary on rnatiers concerning classified intelligence activities or intelligence related to 
national sccurity."91 This section further prohibited those persons who previously possessed an 
active security clearance for access to top secret, sensitive compartmented information from 
entering into said contracts or agreements for a period of one year after their government 
86 ld; H.R. 5743, !12th Cong. (20 12), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-ll2hr5743rfs/pdt!BILLS-
l\2hr5743rfs.pdf(By contrast, the House of Representatives' version did not include any amendments dealing with 
unauthorized disclosures). 
87 S. REP. NO. !12-192 (20 12), 23 available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs ll2th/\12192.pdf. 
88 !d. 
89 S. 3454, \12th Cong. (20 12). 
90 S. REP. NO. 112-192 (20 12), available at http://www.intelligenee.senate.gov/pdfs !12th/ll2 I 92.pdf. 
91 S. 3454, I 12th Cong. (20 12). 
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service.92 The purpose of this particular provision, as outlined by the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, was to prohibit the practice of current and former employees who have or had an 
active security clearance from appearing in media broadcasts to discuss matters concerning 
classified intelligence activities.Y3 
D. 11" 506: Limitation on Persons Authorized to Communicate With the Media 
Section 506 provided that "for each element of the Intelligence Community, only the 
Director and Deputy Director of such element and individuals in the offices of public affairs who 
are specifically designated by the Director may provide background or off-the-record 
information regarding intelligence activities to the media."94 Subsection 506(b) made clear that 
it did not prohibit an officer or employee of an element of the Intelligence Community from 
providing authorized, unclassified, on-the-record briefings to the media or to any person 
affiliated with the media.95 This provision did not prohibit an Intelligence Community official 
from providing necessary threat or other unclassified information to the public so long as the 
official was acting in their official capacity and was authorized to speak to the media on-the-
record. 96 
Part Ill: Criticism and Response 
Title V instantly created a surge of backlash from journalists and other organizations 
across the country within days of passing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.97 The 
bill was criticized on numerous grounds, some of which will be discussed in the following 
subsections. 
92 !d. 
93 S. REP. NO. 112-192 (20 12), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs 112th/112192.pdf. 
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A. Journalists 
Journalists had nothing positive lu say about Tide V of the bill and instead, many called 
for its immediate non-passage. The Washington Post took a harsh view on the proposed 
legislation, using such words to describe it as "crude and dangerous," "poorly drafted," and 
"hastily conceived.'m The main problem journalists had with the bill is that it could end present 
dialogues that take place between journalists and intelligence officials.99 If provisions like this 
pass, these dialogues will have to be logged and reported, and as The Washington Post asserts, 
the result will be fewer such conversations. 100 Overall, it was claimed that the bill's provisions 
were a "draconian attempt at anti-leaking legislation," 101 that would do the complete opposite of 
what it was intended to do by instead creating a counter-intelligence problem. 102 By interfering 
with the daily give-and-take between the media and intelligence agencies, the "lifeblood of a 
democratic society while trying to solve a leak problem [would be impacted] ... without making 
the nation in any way more secure." 103 
Likewise, Reuters called Title V's provisions "strict new measures" which would stop 
the commonplace practice of journalists occasionally being briefed by intelligence officials who 
were directly involved in news events under discussion. 104 Section 505, the provision which 
Reuters believed to be the most threatening, would ban any intelligence official besides press 
officers and agency directors or deputy directors from giving non-attributable background 
98 Editorial Board, Editorial, A Bili to Stop Security Leaks Puts a Plug on Democracy, W i\SHINGTON POST, Jul. 30, 
20 12, http://www. wash ingtonpost.com/opinions/sq ue lching-pub I ic- interest- in-national-
security/20 12/07/30/gJQAFOpHLX story.htm I. 
99 !d. ·-
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101 David Ignatius, Editorial, Senate's Anti-Leaking Bill Doesn't Address the Real Sources of!nformation, 
W ASIIINGTON POST, Jul. 31, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-scnates-anti-leaking-
bi 11-doesnt -address-the- real-sources-of- in formation/20 12/07/3 I I gJ Q APB EINX story. htm I. 
!02 !d. 
[()3 !d. 
104 !d. 
14 
Roseanne Sessa 
briefings to journalists. 105 To end this practice would be to go against a practice that was 
followed by nearly all recent United States administrations. 106 
Bill Keller, former executive editor and current columnist of The New York Times, 
commented on the bill's provisions, stating that although the government "has [the] right and 
responsibility to protect secrets whose disclosure could undermine American security," it also 
has "a responsibility to explain and justify what it is doing in our name." 107 Keller, like his 
fellow journalists at The Washington Post, also agreed that the added provisions were draconian 
and asserted that as a result, the public and Congress will know less about how well the 
intelligence agencies are doing their jobs. 108 Likewise, an editorial in The New York Times 
called the legislation "misguided," claiming that the provisions would cease news coverage of 
national security issues. 109 The bill, drafted in secret without public hearings, was claimed to be 
dangerous. 110 
The Sunshine in Government Initiative 
The Sunshine in Government Initiative (hereafter "SGI") "is a coalition of media groups 
committed to promoting policies that ensure government is accessible, accountable, and 
open." 111 In other words, their mission is primarily dedicated to oversight of the government to 
safeguard democracy. 112 They claim that citizens have a right to this information and that it is 
best served when news media act on behalf of the public to gain access to information. 113 
105 !d. 
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On August I 0, 2012, the SGI wrote a letter to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence about their concerns with Title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2013. 114 In this letter, the SGI analyzed certain provisions which they found to be troubling 
and which they believed would curtail what the public learns about news events and what the 
government is doing in the public's name1 15 These provisions in pmiicular, which the SGI 
claimed threaten the basic relationship between the government and the public via the press, are 
§§ 505, 506, and 508. 116 They claimed that these provisions "significantly undermine[d] 
common practice in reporting on national security issues of vital public interest and appear to be 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." 117 
Section 505, SGI argued, prevented the news media, and consequently, the public's, 
ability to benefit from present and former government official's expertise. 118 These former 
otlicials assist journalists and the public through their analysis and commentary to understand 
issues and ensure that the details of the stories are accurate. 119 These officials likewise allay 
fears during major national crises, such as the September II '11 terrorist attacks. 120 
Even more threatening to the basic relationship was § 506, which would significantly 
constrain the flow of information from the government to the press and public on important 
national security and other issues. 121 It is claimed that this provision would change a practice 
114 Sunshine in Government Initiative, SO! Letter to S'enate Intelligence Committee Regarding S. 3454 (Intelligence 
Authorization Actji"· FY 2013), THE SUNSHINE IN GOVERNMENT BLOO (Aug. 31, 20 12), 
http://sunshineingov. wordpress.com/20 12/08/3 1/sgi-letter-to-ssci-on-intelauthfy 13/. 
115 !d. 
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that has been a part of our democracy from the beginning. 122 Government officials and 
journalists have used background briefings and off-the-record briefings to their mutual benefit 
since the founding of our country. 123 Background briefings and off-the-record communications 
are vital because they help journalists understand the full context of the story, get key details 
right, and ensure that individuals or the United States as a whole will not be harmed by the 
publication of incorrect or sensitive information. Furthermore, these officials can share 
information with the press without fearing for their security if their names are published. 124 
The SGI argued that careful and thoughtful deliberation should be given before 
provisions like these, which impact the delicate balance between the government's right to keep 
cetiain information secret to protect national security and the press's right to gather news and 
inform citizens about what the government is doing in their name, are enacted. 125 Journalists 
handle leaks responsibly and follow procedures which mitigate any potential harm when 
reporting stories based on unauthorized disclosures. 126 
B. American Civil Liberties Union 
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") "is a national organization advocating 
individual rights, by litigating, legislating, and educating the public on a broad array of issues 
affecting individual freedom in the United States." 127 On August 15, 2012, the ACLU wrote a 
letter urging the United States Senate to strip Title V from the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013, claiming that the anti-leak measures would threaten freedom of speech and the 
122 !d. 
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press and would also violate due process and separation of powers. 128 Most of their arguments 
focus on§§ 505 and 506 of the bill. 129 
The ACLU outlined various arguments against the bill. First is their contention that §§ 
505 and 506 unconstitutionally limit the free speech rights of government workers and 
contractors in the intelligence and defense communities. 130 Second, the ACLU maintained that 
these sections unconstitutionally limit the ability of the press to report on matters of public 
interest involving intelligence activities and thus deny the public access to information necessary 
for voters to make informed decisions on national security, and deny Congress information they 
may form the basis for Congressional oversight. 131 Third, they argued that these sections 
unconstitutionally discriminate against the media. 132 Fourth, §§ 505 and 506 unconstitutionally 
violate both the First Amendment and separation of powers by prohibiting members of Congress 
from talking to the press about intelligence aclivities. 133 Fifth, the ACLU argued these sections 
unconstitutionally deny Congress and the public access to information about government waste, 
mismanagement, abuse or fraud by outlawing leaks in the public interest. Finally, these sections 
were said to overall violate open government principles. 134 
Overall, the crux of the ACLU's argument was that the proposed bill was an anti-media 
bill disguised as an anti-leaks bill which would "place a Berlin Wall between the press and the 
intelligence community" and should be opposed in its entirety. 135 The two greatest victims 
would be Congress and the public. Congress would no longer be able to perform its oversight 
128 Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate I (Aug. I 5, 20 12), available at http://www.aelu.org/files/assets/8- I 5- I 2 _-
acluon s 3454 title v - final.pdf. n 9 I d. ... ·- -- -·· -· --· 
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function without access to national security information that is disclosed without organization, 
and as such, would be "cutting out its eyes and off its ears."136 
C. Response to the Criticism 
Only a week after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved Title V and the 
overwhelming criticism the bill faced from members of the media, a Senate panel was 
established to reevaluate its provisions. 137 The Senate panel, chaired by Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, reviewed comments and criticism and considered alterative ideas and modifications to 
the bill as it moved forward. 138 
On November 14, 2012, however, a public hold was placed on the bill by Senator 
Wyden to prevent it from passing without both considerable debate and amendments. 139 In 
placing the bill on hold, Senator Wyden cited significant concerns over the bill's anti-leak 
provisions in a floor statement. 140 Senator Wyden objected to these provisions because it "would 
[have] harmed first amendment rights ... led to less-informed public debate about national 
security issues, and also undermined the due process rights of intelligence agency employees, 
without actually enhancing national security." 141 
The changes made to the bill removed many of the anti-leak provisions that were meant 
to lessen the amount of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 142 On December 21, 
136 Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate 14-15 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/8-15-12_-
- aclu _on_ s _3454_title _ v _-_final. pdf. 
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2012, the only provision that remained was one that would mandate the Executive Branch to 
alert Congress when it "deciassifl:ies] information to disclose it to the press."113 With a majority 
of the anti-leak provisions removed, the bill moved forward and was approved with unanimous 
consent. 144 However, there is a concern that such provisions may be proposed again in the 
future, 145 as the problem of leaks does not appear to be diminishing any time soon. 146 
Part IV: Legal and Policy Based Implications 
Congressional oversight is often seen as inadequate. 147 It is tl·equently said that the press 
is the one entity that is the most capable of providing oversight of government activity. 148 
Senator Wyden confirmed in a recent floor statement that members of Congress do in fact use 
the media as a way to exercise oversight of the Executive Branch, stating: 
While members of Congress do not like to admit it, members often rely on the 
press to inform them about problems that congressional overseers have not 
discovered on their own. I have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee for 
twelve years now, and I can recall numerous specific instances where I have 
found out about serious government wrongdoings - such as the NSA's 
warrantless wiretapping program, or the CIA's coercive interrogation program-
only as a result of disclosures by the press. 149 
Senator Wyden' s account makes clear that members of Congress are dependent on the 
information they receive from the press to make informed decisions. Provisions like those 
included in Title V would severely impair Congress's ability to act as a check on the intelligence 
143 !d. 
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community. 150 In light of the threat of ongomg terrorism, this limitation is especially 
troubling. 151 Congress, however, is not the only body that stands to be affected; the media and 
the public will also be impacted by legislation curtailing such valuable oversight. 
Recognizing the media for the important function they perform, former CIA Director 
Michael Hayden stated, "I have a deep respect for journalists and their profession. Many of them 
- especially in the years since September 11th - have given their lives in the act of keeping 
citizens informed. They are smart, dedicated, and courageous men and women." 152 The media, 
as Hayden acknowledged, are important to a free society and a key to an informed electorate. 153 
To a certain extent, unauthorized disclosures are viewed as both justified and essential to 
preserve democracy. 154 Thus, any harm to national security is generally outweighed by the 
benefits of an independent and informed press. 155 The reason that is most often named by 
advocates of the media's right to publish classified information is to increase public knowledge 
and promote informed debate. 156 
Epitomizing this point is Justice Potter Stewart's dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes. 157 
Justice Stewart averred, "enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon 
which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society."158 
The new trend of anti-leaks legislation has the potential to completely change the way that the 
media can interact with government officials, mainly by limiting Congress's ability to talk to 
150 Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate I (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/8-15-12_-
- aclu _ on_s _ 3454 _title_ v _-_final. pdf. 
151 Frederick A. 0. Schwartz, Jr. et al. UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF 
TERROR (2007), 202. 
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members of the press about issues of national security and intelligence. 159 Such legislation 
seems to threaten the very purpose of the media's existence, and to leave the media unable to 
report on such matters. This would undermine democracy by denying Americans access to this 
information that is essential to national debate on these critical issues. 160 
"At the beginning of the chain of democratic responsibility stand the people. It is the 
people who are entitled to decide the course of the Republic based on a clear view of the 
facts." 161 Thus, in a democratic society, the national security interest must be balanced against 
the public's right to know. 162 The term, "right to know," refers to a variety of concepts: the 
public's general right to be informed about governmental activities and performance; the right to 
compel the government to produce specific information within its control; and the right of access 
to particular government proceedings. 163 Provisions like Title V "limit a government employee's 
dissemination of information about the government," 164 restrict the public's right to know, and 
forge a barrier between the government and the people. 165 In essence, the public will no longer 
have information about how the government is managing national security issues aside from 
authorized disclosures. 166 
Because the public wili lack access to this information, this will in turn impact the 
public's ability to make informed decisions about who they choose to elect into office and 
159 Jennifer Lynch & Trevor Timm, Senate Anti-Leaks Bill Threatens the Rights ofthe Press and the Public, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Aug. 6, 2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/20 12/08/senates-anti-leaks-
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subsequently heighten skepticism of government, "for without an informed and free press there 
cannot be an enlightened people."167 To imagine a world in which these provisions were to exist 
would be to envision one where the Pentagon Papers, the Watergate Scandal, crimes of torture, 
extraordinary rendition, or the targeted killing program under President Obama, would have 
never been disclosed to the American public. 168 Of all of these leaks, the one most frequently 
cited over the years where the value of an enlightened citizenry was perceived to overcome the 
harm to national security has been the incident of the Pentagon Papers. 169 
In 1971, The New York Times began to publish the Pentagon Papers, a document that 
outlined the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. 170 This document revealed to 
the public that the Johnson administration had lied to both them and Congress about vital issues 
of national security. 171 The Nixon administration took action, obtaining court orders to enjoin 
The New York Times and The Washington Post from publishing any articles containing 
information regarding the Pentagon Papers as both newspapers had published articles containing 
classified information prior to the injunction. 172 The Court in New York Times Co. v. United 
States ultimately ruled that the newspapers could resume publication. 173 Three concurring 
opinions discuss the media's incentive to maintain an enlightened citizenry. 174 
Justice Potter Stewart, writing one of the concurrences, discussed the importance of 
enlightenment, stating, "the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas 
167 New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713,728 (1971). 
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of national defense may lie in an enlightened citizenry - in an informed and critical public 
opinion which alone can here protect the values of a democratic government." 175 As previously 
discussed, restraints on executive power are important to preserve Congress's ability to exercise 
oversight due to the rise in executive power. 176 This rise shows that the country is at its strongest 
when policies are formulated by deliberative, open, and democratic processes. 177 Without the 
clarity that informed criticism brings and without candid public debate about goals and means, 
our security policy all becomes too elicit, foolish, and harmful. 178 
Thus, a provision like Title V's § 505 would block off an important source of information 
to Congress. 179 The media's coverage of intelligence matters provides vital information to 
Congress in its role as a check against the Executive Branch. 180 The fact that executive power is 
on the rise means that Congress needs to be even more diligent in its oversight of the Executive 
Branch. 181 Past executive unilateralism has brought torture, extraordinary rendition, and 
domestic surveillance. 182 This unilateral ism not only undermines the delicate balance of our 
Constitution, but also lessens our human liberties and hurts vital counterterrorism campaigns. 183 
Questions about what can properly be kept from the public are entirely in the hands of the 
presidents, leaving them free to declassify selectively for narrow partisan or protective ends. 184 
Congress needs to ensure that there is a continuous flow of accurate information about the 
175 New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. at 728 (1971). 
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functioning and malfunctioning of the Executive Branch, and the one way it is able to do this is 
by its oversight through the media. 185 Congress can do this by using the tools available to them: 
investigations and crafting carefullegislation. 186 
Furthermore, § 50S's prohibition on former and current government employees acting as 
consultants and advisors to the media could also extend to members of Congress and to members 
of their staff. 187 Congressmen's responsibilities include criticizing abuses by the Executive 
Branch, and this is frequently done through the media. 188 Section 50S's provisions would thus 
deny members of Congress access to the media and would greatly lessen their ability to exercise 
their oversight over the Executive Branch. 189 
Overall, to put forward provisions of this nature, Congress will be denied the information 
it needs about national security and intelligence to effectively perform its job. 190 To inhibit 
Congress from its constitutionally granted oversight function is to diminish its balance among 
the other branches, and to impact two key allies along the way: the media and the public. 
Part V: Proposed Solution 
Since September 11 111 , there has been a near decade-long war against terror. 191 The War 
on Terror has subsequently produced an increase in the campaign to stop leaks of classified 
information from being reported to the media. 192 Leaks of classified information have risen over 
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TERROR 205 (2007). 
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the course of recent administrations, particularly during Obama's term over the last four years. 193 
Based on this recent rise in leaks to the media and in light of historical leaks that have impacted 
the country's national security, it is clearly a problem that will not be going away at any time in 
the near future. As the character and nature of leaks change throughout the course of history, 
adaptive measures need to be taken to protect the national security of our country while still 
protecting the free press and an informed public. 194 Adaptive measures, like those that were 
proposed in Title V, were ill-conceived, hastily drafted, and should not be proposed to eliminate 
the current leak epidemic. "[Legislation of this kind] could tip the balance dangerously" 195 and 
the tension between the need for secrecy and the democratic requirements of openness and 
transparency will only be exacerbated. As Yale Law scholar Charles Black stated in 1975, 
196 
"Congress has abundantly passed the buck." 
As succinctly stated by Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith, "there is no perfect 
solution to the problem." 197 The leak problem is not one that can be solved with one piece of 
legislation quickly passed through Congress. The tension that exists requires that there be more 
informed debate involving members of the public regarding any legislation that potentially 
affects their right to know. 
Congress must therefore look for ways to help the Executive Branch safeguard 
information that intelligence agencies wish to keep secret. Legislation that threatens to encroach 
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upon the rights of the media or that would lessen the public's access to information for which 
they have a right to know should be critically examined and thought about before an attempt is 
made to attach it onto a piece of legislation last minute. The Director of National Intelligence 
has even stated that provisions such as these would not significantly deter leaks nor would it help 
protect sensitive national security information. 198 Furthermore, Robert Litt, the General Counsel 
for the Director of National Intelligence, recently informed the American Bar Association that 
the proposals "really would not have any deterrent impact or punitive impact on leaks, and might 
in fact have an adverse impact on the free flow of information to the American people." 199 
Based on this information alone, it is apparent that the very purpose for which the bill has set out 
to achieve has failed. 
Additionally, m crafting new legislation, Congress must be careful not to limit its 
oversight function of the Executive Branch. If members of Congress fail to have access to media 
reports on national security issues, they would be ineffective in their oversight duties, resulting in 
the Executive Branch wielding more power - an undesirable consequence that would tip the 
balance of powers among the three branches. "It [ultimately] comes down to striking a 
balance. "200 
Conclusion 
The history of national security leaks in the United States is something that has occurred 
on a regular basis since the founding of the country and has only increased in volume in recent 
years. Title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 includes provisions 
198 Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Floor Statement on the Removal of Controversial Leaks Provisions 
from Intelligence Authorization Bill (Dec. 21, 20 12), available at http://www. wyden.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/wyden-floor-statement-on-the-removal-of-controversial-leaks-provisions-from-intelligence-authorization-
bill. 
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that, if adopted, will negatively impact the system of congressional oversight by prohibiting 
members of Congress from speaking to the media regarding inteiligence activities. Congress 
regularly interacts with the media to ensure that the Executive Branch does not wield too much 
authority and does not tip the balance of powers among the three branches. Based on the rise in 
number of unauthorized disclosures, legislation must be carefhlly debated and crafted among 
members of Congress and revealed to the media and members of the public as it may potentially 
afiect their individual rights. "It is important for Congress to remember that not everything that 
is done in the name of stopping leaks is necessarily wise policy."201 Thus, Congress must look 
for a cautious, long-term solution to a recurring, long-standing problem. 
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